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Abstract. Countermeasures to defeat most of side-channel attacks on
exponentiations are based on randomization of processed data. The ex-
ponent and the message blinding are particular techniques to thwart
simple, collisions, diﬀerential and correlation analyses. Attacks based on
a single (trace) execution of exponentiations, like horizontal correlation
analysis and proﬁled template attacks, have shown to be eﬃcient against
most of popular countermeasures. In this paper we show how an unsuper-
vised learning can explore the remaining leakages caused by conditional
control tests and memory addressing in a RNS-based implementation of
the RSA. The device under attack is protected with the exponent blind-
ing and the leak resistant arithmetic. The developed attack combines
the leakage of several samples over the segments of the exponentiation
in order to recover the entire exponent. We demonstrate how to ﬁnd the
points of interest using trace pre-processing and clustering algorithms.
This attack can recover the exponent using a single trace.
Keywords: RSA, Randomized Exponentiation, Electromagnetic Analy-
sis, Unsupervised Learning, Clustering Algorithms, Single-Execution At-
tacks.
1 Introduction
Not only designers of cryptographic devices have to implement the algorithms
eﬃciently, they also have to ensure that sensible information that leaks through
several side-channels (time, temperature, power consumption, electromagnetic
emanations, etc.) during the execution of an algorithm, remains unexploited
by an attacker. If not suﬃciently protected, both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to these so-called side-channel
attacks (SCA). For public-key algorithms such as RSA, the main operation to be
armoured consists of a multi-digit exponentiation over a ﬁnite ring. In this paper,
we present an improved single-execution attack on a randomized implementation
of RSA. However, the ideas and tools that we exploit would also apply in the
context of CRT-RSA and (hyper)elliptic curves.
Attacking an exponentiation consists of identifying the bits of the exponent,
a value that is often to be kept secret (it is either a secret key or a random secret
value). Simple side-channel attacks [2], which uses a single trace of execution,
are easily protected using so-called constant-time algorithms such as square-and-
multiply-always [4], the Montgomery ladder [7] or atomicity [23].
However, these constant-time algorithms are not suﬃcient to defeat the more
powerful diﬀerential [3] and correlation attacks [5]. Although very eﬃcient on not
suﬃciently protected implementations, these attacks suﬀer from the very large
number of traces to be collected in order to recover (part of) the secret. Colli-
sion attacks proposed by Fouque in 2003 [6] are very eﬃcient; they only require
two traces of execution on well chosen inputs. All these attacks are generally
protected using exponent and/or message blinding using elementary algebraic
manipulations. For example, randomization of an RSA exponent relies on the
fact that md ≡ md+rϕ(n) mod n for any (random) value r (see Section 5). Apart
from these well known tricks, randomization can also take place at the arith-
metic level. The LRA concept [9], based on the Residue Number System, seems
to be a robust, yet eﬃcient [24, 25] alternative to more expensive (hardware)
countermeasures.
Novel attacks [14–17] have recently emerged. Unlike the well studied family
of diﬀerential [3] and correlation attacks [5], these so-called horizontal correla-
tion attacks (HCA), aim at correlating the Hamming Weight HW(m) of a known
messagem, with a set of well-chosen sample points ti from one single trace. Some
of them [15, 17] are indeed eﬃcient in the presence of message blinding. They
exploit the very high regularity of multi-digit exponentiation algorithms and
represent a very serious threat against classical randomization countermeasures.
A major advantage of single-trace-based attacks is their natural immunity to ex-
ponent blinding, since, in many cases, recovering a random exponent is suﬃcient
to break the cryptosystem (see Section 5).
Proﬁled template attacks can recover the exponent using few traces. As the
original template attack [11] suggests, the attacker must have full control of
the device. In particular, he must be able to send plain-texts of his choice to a
known key device. In the case of public-key algorithms, the public-key is known
and also can be used in the proﬁling phase. In this case, the pre-computations
whose objective is to build the template set is refereed to as supervised learn-
ing. In [13] supervised template attacks are successfully applied on modular
exponentiations in order to diﬀerentiate squarings from multiplications. More
recently, a template attack on constant-time exponentiation algorithms was pre-
sented in [12], while [19] suggests a technique to attack the exponent blinding.
A template attack targeting the memory addressing was presented in [22]. All
those methods fall into the class of supervised attacks, i.e., a learning phase
is required during which the adversary constructs templates by exploring the
statistical characteristics of various types of operations.
When the adversary does not have a full control of the device, unsupervised
methods are necessary. In [18], unsupervised learning has been presented to
demonstrate the eﬃciency of localized EM attacks on exponentiations using a k-
means clustering algorithm to diﬀerentiate the attacked samples. Their attack is
performed on an ECC [27] implementation over a binary ﬁeld using Lopez-Dahab
coordinates [26]. The scalar is recovered using leakages collected during the exe-
cution of a single scalar multiplication (k ∈ Z, P ∈ E(F2m) −→ [k]P ∈ E(F2m).
However, their attack relies on the ability to acquire several simultaneous EM
traces from diﬀerent probe positions1. The leakages obtained from these multi-
measurement sources are then combined together in order to reduce the signal-
to-noise ratio. By doing so, they managed to classify the sampled points into
two distinct sets which correspond to the zero bits (resp. non-zero bits) of the
scalar k.
In this paper, we present a single-trace, single-probe unsupervised attack,
i.e. the side-channel data is collected from one EM probe only. In the next sec-
tions, we present the setting and statistical tools that we used to recover the
entire exponent of a constant-time, randomized RSA implementation. Our at-
tack is unsupervised because it does not require any a priori knowledge of the
device, in particular we did not use the public key or send any chosen mes-
sages in order to learn the characteristics of the device. The chip under attack
is a constant-time, RNS-based FPGA implementation of RSA protected with
the Leak Resistant Arithmetic [9] and exponent blinding. Since all manipulated
data is randomized, we explore the remaining leakages due to control instruc-
tions and memory activities. As previously demonstrated in the literature [20],
memory and register addresses leak information related to the secret key. In-
stead of using simultaneous measurements as in [18], we combine the cluster
classiﬁcations of several samples from each bit of the exponent. We thus process
the probabilities obtained from this ﬁrst phase to recover the entire exponent.
Our attack requires four phases: trace pre-processing, points of interest identi-
ﬁcation, fuzzy k-means clustering, and exponent recovery. For this ﬁnal phase,
we present results obtained with three diﬀerent statistical techniques (majority
rule, normal probability density function and Bayesian classiﬁer).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives details about the ran-
domized exponentiation and the device under attack. The unsupervised learning
based on clustering algorithms is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
attack in details and the results that we obtained with the three statistical tools
mentioned above. Possible countermeasures are suggested in Section 6.
2 The Randomized Exponentiation and the Device
Under Test
The device under attack is a RNS-based implementation of RSA mapped onto
a Spartan-3E xc3s1600 FPGA. For demonstration purposes, we considered a
very weak 512-bit RSA. The modular exponentiation is computed with the reg-
ular and SPA-protected Montgomery ladder [8] using two sets of RNS bases A
and B [10]. The atomic square-and-multiply [23] is also a regular and faster ex-
ponentiation. However as proposed in [15], randomized exponentiations can be
explored through horizontal correlation attacks (HCA) if one of the intermediate
operands, in the case the randomized input message, is used in several modular
multiplications.
1 Their setting simulates the use of 9 probes uniformly positioned over the chip under
attack.
According to the leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) concepts [9], the RNS mod-
uli can be randomized before each exponentiation. This countermeasure acts as
a message blinding technique because and oﬀers a high degree of randomization
to the data. Furthermore, HCA exploits the regularity of long-integer multiplica-
tion (or squaring). The parallel RNS arithmetic is then a very limiting factor for
this attack. Moreover, our hardware is protected with exponent blinding. Alg. 1
shows the randomized exponentiation.
Algorithm 1: LRA-RNS Montgomery Powering Ladder [9]







bi, gcd(A,B) = 1, gcd(B,N) = 1 and d = (dℓ...d2d1)2.
Result: z = xd mod N in A ∪ B
1 Pre-Computations: |AB mod N |A∪B
2 randomize(A,B)
3 dr = d+ r.ϕ(N)
4 A0 = MM(1, AB mod N,N,A,B) (in A ∪ B)
5 A1 = MM(x,AB mod N,N,A,B) (in A ∪ B)






, N,B,A) (in A ∪ B)
8 Adri = MM(Adri , Adri , N,B,A) (in A ∪ B)
9 end
10 A0 = MM(A0, 1, N,B,A) (in A ∪ B)
The operation MM(x, y,N,B,A) returns xyB−1 mod N in the two RNS
bases A and B. Both squarings and multiplications are computed with the same
number of clock cycles.
First, as the exponent is randomized, single-trace attack was the only option.
Further, because the manipulated data is randomized with LRA, the target in-
formation of our unsupervised attack is not the data contribution in the EM
traces. By data, we mean the intermediate variables which depend on the ran-
domly selected RNS bases and the input message. Exponent-dependent decisions
are taken by the architecture’s control in order to determine the memory address
for reading or writing operands before, during and after the modular multiplica-
tions. These conditional tests, as well as the accessed memory addresses, cause
subtle leakages of information. These are the only sources of leakages that we
exploit in the present unsupervised attack. We present the details of our attack
in the next sections.
3 Unsupervised Learning and the Clustering Algorithms
Clustering is one of the most frequently used data mining techniques, which is an
unsupervised learning process for partitioning a data set into sub-groups so that
the instances within a group are similar to each other and are very dissimilar to
the instances of other groups. That is, we shall see what can be done when the
collected samples are unlabelled and must be grouped in homogeneous clusters.
Two diﬀerent clustering methods are used in this work: the k-means and the
fuzzy k-means algorithms [28].
The k-means algorithm is a geometric procedure for ﬁnding c means or cen-
ters (µ1, . . . , µc) considering a set of n samples xj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The initial-
ization phase consists in deﬁning the number of clusters c and setting a random
sample to each mean µi. Thereafter, the algorithm computes the Euclidean dis-
tances EDi,j =∥ xj − µi ∥2 for all n samples to obtain the maximum-likelihood
estimation of the means µi. The k-means algorithm is shown in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2: K-Means Clustering Algorithm
1 begin initialize x, n, c, µ1, . . . , µc
2 do classify n samples xj according to nearest µi by computing EDi,j
3 recompute µi
4 until no change in µi
5 return µ1, . . . , µc
6 end
The k-means algorithm iterates until no changes in µi are veriﬁed. In all
iterations each sample is assumed to be in exactly one cluster. The fuzzy k-
means algorithm relaxes this condition and assumes that each sample xj has
some membership with diﬀerent clusters ωi, rather than belonging completely
to just one cluster.
Initially, the probabilities of cluster membership for each point xj of a n
sample vector x are normalized according to all clusters ωi as:
c∑
i=1
P (ωi|xj) = 1 (1)
where P (ωi|xj) is the probability that the sample xj is in the cluster ωi. At
each iteration of the fuzzy k-means algorithm, the means (or centers) µi are






and the new probabilities are recomputed:
P (ωi|xj) = (1/EDij)
1/(b−1)∑c
r=1(1/EDrj)1/(b−1)
, EDij =∥ xj − µi ∥2 (3)
where b > 1 is a free parameter chosen to adjust the “blending” of diﬀerent clus-
ters. Its appropriate choice can improve the cluster classiﬁcation if the analyzed
data set is too much noisy. In this work, this parameter is set to 2. Alg. 3 shows
the fuzzy k-means algorithm.
Algorithm 3: Fuzzy K-Means Clustering Algorithm
1 begin initialize n, c, µ1, . . . , µc, P (ωi|xj)
2 normalize probabilities of cluster memberships by Eq. 1
3 do classify n samples according to nearest µi
4 recompute µi by Eq. 2
5 recompute P (ωi|xj) by Eq. 3
6 until no change in µi and P (ωi|xj)
7 return µ1, . . . , µc
8 end
The next section describes the unsupervised attack in four phases. The k-
means algorithm is used in the search for the points of interest. The fuzzy k-
means is employed in the cluster classiﬁcation after having selected the points
of interest.
4 The Unsupervised Attack
In a realistic assumption for single-execution attacks on exponentiations, the
adversary works in a noisy environment and, as already stated in [19], "single
bits are never known with certainty [. . . ] and an SPA attacker [. . . ] can only
give a probability that any particular operation is a squaring or a multiplication",
if the attacked device executes the square-and-multiply algorithm. If a single-
execution attack is able of recovering 98% of the 1024 exponent bits and the





j = 2144 steps to retrieve the incorrect bits.
Therefore, the number of wrong bits in the recovered exponent must be at least
very low, otherwise a single-execution attack is impracticable.
When applying non-proﬁled attacks on a single trace of an exponentiation,
the adversary has no knowledge about the operation features (mean µ, variance
σ2). All information must be recovered in a unsupervised manner. Regular bi-
nary algorithms [8][23] compute the exponentiation iteratively and for each bit
of the exponent (or segment) same operations are performed. Thus, a initial par-
titioning step is applied to the measured electromagnetic exponentiation trace
in order to have ℓ segments, each one representing one exponent bit interpre-
tation. The segments are aligned and compressed to reduce the noise and clock
jitter eﬀects. Thereafter, as proposed in this attack, several points of interest
are identiﬁed in each segment by computing an estimated and approximated
diﬀerence of means. The cluster classiﬁcation using the fuzzy k-means algorithm
is applied in each set of compressed samples, each set representing a selected
point of interest and providing an estimated exponent. The last step consists
in retrieving the randomized exponent using all estimated exponents obtained
with the cluster classiﬁcation. The proposed attack, divided in four phases, is
detailed below.
4.1 Phase 1: Trace Pre-processings
The attack starts by acquiring a single execution exponentiation trace from the
device, considering the k-th randomized exponent d1:ℓ,k, where ℓ is the length
of the exponent. In our case, the exponentiation is computed using the regular
Montgomery ladder algorithm. The EM trace, with size L, is sliced in ℓ opera-
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Fig. 1. Exponentiation trace and the segmentation in multiplications and squarings.
Each multiplication (Mi) or squaring (Si) in the acquired EM trace contains
74 clock cycles. The oscilloscope sampling rate was set to 20GS/s during the
acquisition step and the hardware computes the exponentiation at a clock fre-
quency of 50MHz, resulting in 59200 samples per exponent bit interpretation
(MiSi). The device under attack does not feature any hardware countermeasure,
e.g., time disarrangement, dummy cycles or frequency dividers. Therefore, the
ℓ segments of multiplication-squarings MiSi, can be easily identiﬁed and com-
bined to explore the leakage of information. However, the clock jitter eﬀect is
still present in the acquired EM trace and must be suppressed using a trace
alignment procedure.
Another important role in unsupervised single-execution attacks is to identify
the points of interest which present greater leakages. A simple solution consists
in averaging the 400 samples of one clock cycle into 1 sample and taking each
averaged sample as a point of interest. Here, in order to preserve the informa-
tion over smaller windows, the trace is compressed by averaging 100 samples
into 1 sample. Then, this allows reducing the amount of data from 59200 to
592 compressed samples during an exponent bit interpretation di,k (denoted by
operation ⟨MS⟩i in the sequel).









t1,1 t1,2 · · · t1,592
t2,1 t2,2 · · · t2,592
...
... . . .
...
tℓ,1 tℓ,2 · · · tℓ,592
 (4)
Each row of the matrix T is a set of compressed samples ⟨MS⟩i = {ti,j}
representing an exponent bit interpretation di,k. The term ℓ is the exponent bit
length and, of course, is the iterations number in the algorithm 1 (steps 6 to
9). After the trace pre-processing, the attack enters in the second phase that
consists in ﬁnding the points of interest.
4.2 Phase 2: Finding the Points of Interest
The success of the attack depends on the choice of the points of interest. With
proﬁling or supervised attacks, these points can be found by computing a dif-
ference of means and observing the highest peaks of amplitude. In such a case,
the adversary has a known key d and computes averaged traces Tr0 and Tr1
representing the truncated windows of sampled points when the exponent bit is








Because the presented attack aims at revealing the exponent through an un-
supervised manner, the attacker should be considered as having minimal knowl-
edge about the target implementation to identify the points of interest. Because
all data are randomized, the remaining leakage is related to addressing and con-
trol executions. Therefore, by observing and studying the collected EM trace,
the attacker can, for instance, localize the time points where the device per-
forms such operations and discard the points that clearly show no compromising
information.
Our unsupervised analysis needs a set of points of interest in each segment
⟨MS⟩i to retrieve the exponent. A basic idea is to initially apply a clustering
algorithm over each set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,j} (each column of matrix
T ) and ﬁnd 592 approximated exponents[d1:ℓ,j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ 592. In our practical
experiments, this leads to the recovery of around 93% of the entire exponent on
the most leaking set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,j}. It is insuﬃcient. However,
this result can be used for calculating approximated and averaged traces T̂r0
and T̂r1 from the approximated exponent[d1:ℓ,j . For this initial step, we consid-
ered the k-means clustering algorithm because it is a simple and fast technique.
Fig. 2(a) shows the relation between the percentage of success recovery of the
exponent and the analyzed set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,j}, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 592.
If the adversary selects the most likely exponent (in the case the set {t1:ℓ,465})
he computes the averaged traces T̂r0 and T̂r1. Fig. 2(b) shows the approximated
diﬀerence of mean traces D̂ = T̂r0− T̂r1. The diﬀerence of means D = Tr0−Tr1,
for the real randomized exponent running in the device, is depicted in Fig. 2(c).
Note that the results in Fig. 2(b) and (c) are quite similar and the adversary
can select points of interest observing the highest peaks of amplitude in D̂. In a
worst case, the adversary would try to compute approximated diﬀerence of mean
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Fig. 2. (a) Percentage of correct exponent bits. (b) Approximated diﬀerence of mean
traces D̂ = T̂r0 − T̂r1 (c) Diﬀerence of mean traces D = Tr0 − Tr1.
traces, and selecting points of interest, from each one of the 592 possibilities.
It is clear that the selection of the most leaking point of interest reduces the
computational time of the unsupervised attack. Besides, we observed (see Fig.
2) that the highest percentages of correct exponent recovery match with the
highest peaks of amplitude in the approximated diﬀerence of means D̂. We used
this observation as a heuristic in order to select the points of interest.
4.3 Phase 3: Cluster Classiﬁcation
After computing the approximated diﬀerence of mean traces from the set of
compressed samples {t1:ℓ,465}, let us suppose the selection of u points of interest
P = {pj}, for 1 ≤ j ≤ u, among the 592 possibilities. Observing the approxi-
mated diﬀerence of means D̂ in Fig. 2(b), 17 points of interest were selected (pj
= 165, 166, 169, 281, 282, 284, 285, 342, 461, 462, 464, 465, 497, 498, 577, 580,
581), which evidently are the most leaking points.
A clustering is computed for all set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,pj}, for
1 ≤ j ≤ u by applying the fuzzy k-means algorithm. Thus, a classiﬁcation for
these samples in two classes (bits zeros and ones), which leads to one estimated
exponent \d1:ℓ,pj per set of samples {t1:ℓ,pj}, is obtained. Because real attacks
work on noisy environments, the clustering over each point of interest pj con-
tains errors of classiﬁcation. Fig. 3 illustrates the cluster classiﬁcation error for
the set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,169}. Fig. 3(a) shows the correct classiﬁcation
according to the real randomized exponent d1:ℓ,k and the Fig. 3(b) presents the
cluster classiﬁcation returned by the fuzzy k-means algorithm.
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Fig. 3. Errors of cluster classiﬁcation: (a) Correct classiﬁcation. (b) Fuzzy k-means
classiﬁcation.
For each point of interest pj , the fuzzy k-means clustering algorithm returns
two centers µ1 andmu2 and two groups of clustered samples. A common problem
would be to identify what class or operation (exponent bit zero or one) each
cluster center represents. With u = 17 cluster classiﬁcations into two classes,
there will be 217 = 131072 diﬀerent possibilities. The identiﬁcation of the classes
can be performed in two diﬀerent ways:
1. Instead of selecting random samples to initialize the values µ1 and µ2 in the
Alg. 3, we select the minimum and maximum samples from the set {t1:ℓ,pj}
according to their amplitudes. The initialization in Alg 3 is done by assigning
µ1 = min{t1:ℓ,pj} and µ2 = max{t1:ℓ,pj}. It ensures that µ1 < µ2 after the
clustering. Then, comparing the resulting cluster means µ1 and µ2 with the
amplitude of the approximated diﬀerence of means D̂, and also T̂r0 and T̂r1,
it is straightforward to identify the classes.
exponent classiﬁed exponent bits d̂i,k correct
\d1:40,p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 76.02%
\d1:40,p2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 76.42%
\d1:40,p3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 76.42%
\d1:40,p4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 76.42%
\d1:40,p5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 78.86%
\d1:40,p6 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 79.27%
\d1:40,p7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 78.86%
\d1:40,p8 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 80.08%
\d1:40,p9 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 80.08%
\d1:40,p10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 80.89%
\d1:40,p11 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 82.52%
\d1:40,p12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 82.52%
\d1:40,p13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 83.74%
\d1:40,p14 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 89.43%
\d1:40,p15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 90.65%
\d1:40,p16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 91.25%
\d1:40,p17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 93.06%
\d1:40,k 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100%
d1:40,k 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100%
Table 1. Cluster classiﬁcation of the (ﬁrst 40) exponent bits and the recovery of [d1:ℓ,k
using the majority rule.
2. As all selected leaking points may lead to more than 50% of exponent re-
covery, we take one recovered exponent [d1:ℓ,v from one point of interest v,
v ∈ {pj}, and compute the bitwise XOR between this exponent and the
other estimated exponent values. Let ℓ be the size of the exponent, \d1:ℓ,pj
all the recovered exponents for 1 ≤ j ≤ u, pj ̸= v, and the bitwise re-
sults h1:ℓ =XOR(\d1:ℓ,pj ,[d1:ℓ,v) for pi ̸= v. If
∑ℓ
i=1 hi < ℓ/2 then returns
NOT(\d1:ℓ,pj ), otherwise keep unchanged.
After the cluster classiﬁcations and respective association of the classes, the
attack enters in the last step in order to combine all estimated exponents into
one ﬁnal exponent.
4.4 Phase 4: Exponent Recovery
The recovery of the ﬁnal randomized exponent is computed through three diﬀer-
ent statistical techniques: majority decision, probability density function (pdf)
and Bayesian classiﬁer.
Majority Decision: Table 1 shows the cluster classiﬁcation results for the
ﬁrst 40 bits of each estimated exponent \d1:ℓ,pj considering the u = 17 points
of interest. Using the majority decision we can retrieve a randomized exponent
[d1:ℓ,k.
Because the majority rule is a simple statistical procedure, it requires more
points of interest for achieving the correct exponent if compared to the next two
adopted techniques, as will be demonstrated at the end of this section.
Probability Density Function: In [19], the probability density function,
which is based on the normal distributions parameters N (µ0, σ0) and N (µ1, σ1),
where µ and σ are the mean and the standard deviation, returns the likelihood
that a sample ti,j is the operation when the exponent bit di,k = 0. As the pre-
sented analysis is unsupervised, we do not know µ0 and µ1. However, the fuzzy
k-means cluster classiﬁcation returns two means or centers µ1 and µ2 for each
set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,pj} which can be used in place of the means. The
standard deviation σ is computed from all the set of samples {t1:ℓ,pj}, consider-
ing the evaluated point of interest pi. Then, the likelihood that a sample ti,pj is
an operation when di,k = 0 is given by the equation below:






2 (ti,pj−µ1)2/2σ2 + e−
1
2 (ti,pj−µ2)2/2σ2
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, 1 ≤ j ≤ u (6)
Following, the deﬁned sum of probabilities gives the likelihood that a set
of points of interest {ti,p1:u}, representing the operation ⟨MS⟩i, is an operation






p(ti,pj , µ1) 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ (7)




0, if S0,1:u ≥ 0.5)
1, if S0,1:u < 0.5)
(8)
Table 2 shows the ﬁnal sum of probabilities S0,1:u and the exponent decision
from Eq. 8 considering the 20 ﬁrst exponent bits \d1:20,k (for space in Table 2)
and u = 17 points of interest.
Bayesian Classiﬁer: The Bayesian decision theory makes the assumption that
the decision problem is posed in probability terms. The classiﬁer lies on the
computation of the posterior probabilities P (µc|ti,pj ) which is computed from
the prior probabilities P (µc) and the probability density function for normal
distributions p(ti,pj , µc), where c = {0, 1} and p(ti,pj , µc) ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the
classiﬁcation starts by obtaining the pdf estimation for each point of interest
ti,pj of each operation i. Again, this analysis considers the two cluster centers
µ1 and µ2 in the place of means and the standard deviation is computed from
all the set of compressed samples {t1:ℓ,pj}:
point probabilities p(ti,pj , µ1) correct
\d1:20,p1 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 76.02%
\d1:20,p2 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 76.42%
\d1:20,p3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 76.83%
\d1:20,p4 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 76.42%
\d1:20,p5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.3 78.86%
\d1:20,p6 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4 78.86%
\d1:20,p7 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.1 78.86%
\d1:20,p8 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.2 80.08%
\d1:20,p9 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.4 80.08%
\d1:20,p10 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.1 80.89%
\d1:20,p11 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 82.52%
\d1:20,p12 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.1 82.52%
\d1:20,p13 0.1 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 83.74%
\d1:20,p14 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.2 89.43%
\d1:20,p15 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.7 89.43%
\d1:20,p16 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 90.65%
\d1:20,p17 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 93.06%
S0,1:17 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 100%
\d1:20,k 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 100%
d1:20,k 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 100%
Table 2. Cluster classiﬁcation of the (ﬁrst 20) exponent bits and the recovery of [d1:ℓ,k
using the probability density function for normal distributions.


















The probability density functions p(ti,pj , µ1) and p(ti,pj , µ2) are obtained for
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and 1 ≤ j ≤ u. Considering P (µc) as the prior probabilities for
the points of interest pj−1, where c = {0, 1}, by Bayes’s formula we obtain the
posterior probabilities P (µc|ti,pj ) for the operations i and points of interest pj :
P (µ1|ti,pj ) =
p(ti,pj , µ1)P (µ1)
p(ti,pj , µ1)P (µ1) + p(ti,pj , µ2)P (µ2)
(11)
P (µ2|ti,pj ) =
p(ti,pj , µ2)P (µ2)
p(ti,pj , µ1)P (µ1) + p(ti,pj , µ2)P (µ2)
(12)
The Bayes’s formula is repeated for all points of interest pj over the same
operation i. At the end, this estimation returns the probabilities that a certain
operation ⟨MS⟩i is being executed when the exponent bit di,k = 0. Table 3 shows
the evolution of posterior probabilities P (µ1|ti,pj ) over all points of interest ti,pj ,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ u, and the respective percentage of correct exponent bits. Again, in
this example we consider the ﬁrst 20 exponent bits.
point probabilities P (µ1|t1:20,pj ) correct
P (µ1|t1:20,p1 ) 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 75.23%
P (µ1|t1:20,p2 ) 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.6 82.89%
P (µ1|t1:20,p3 ) 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.6 89.02%
P (µ1|t1:20,p4 ) 0.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 93.45%
P (µ1|t1:20,p5 ) 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 96.34%
P (µ1|t1:20,p6 ) 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 97.56%
P (µ1|t1:20,p7 ) 0.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 99.59%
P (µ1|t1:20,p8 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.59%
P (µ1|t1:20,p9 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.59%
P (µ1|t1:20,p10 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.18%
P (µ1|t1:20,p11 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
P (µ1|t1:20,p12 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
P (µ1|t1:20,p13 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
P (µ1|t1:20,p14 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
P (µ1|t1:20,p15 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
P (µ1|t1:20,p16 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
P (µ1|t1:20,p17 ) 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.00%
\d1:20,k 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 100%
d1:20,k 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 100%
Table 3. Cluster classiﬁcation of the (ﬁrst 20) exponent bits and the recovery of[di:ℓ,k
using the Bayesian classiﬁer.
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Fig. 4. Relation between the exponent recovery and the number of points of interest:
(a) from the least to the most leaking point and (b) from the most to the least leaking
point (this Figure is represented in a diﬀerent scale).
For the three presented methods, we showed the cluster classiﬁcation results
for u = 17 points of interest. Fig. 4 demonstrates the evolution of the exponent
recovery related to the number of points. In Fig. 4(a), it was considered the
evolution from the least to the most leaking point. Note that using the Bayesian
classiﬁer are necessary 11 points to recovery the entire exponent. The same result
can be observed in Table 3. On the other hand, in Fig. 4(b), if the evolution is
from the most to the least leaking point, the Bayesian classiﬁer achieves 100%
of the exponent using only 4 points of interest per exponentiation segment.
5 Obtaining the Private Key from Randomized
Exponents
For decryption and message signing, the retrieval of the randomized exponent
dr = d+ r.ϕ(N) is the same as retrieving d. Therefore, a single-execution attack
is suﬃcient to break the target device. However, for non-CRT implementations of
RSA and in the case when the recovered randomized exponents present few error
bits, the adversary can also improve the procedure using a step-by-step attack,
as proposed in [19]. In this case, the recovering of several blinding factors r in
the exponent randomization is used to derive the exponent d.
Approximately the ℓ/2 most signiﬁcant bits of the exponent d are exposed
when the public key e is small (3, 17 or 216 + 1). In this procedure, the term





Consequently, the adversary can obtain the ℓ/2 most signiﬁcant bits of all
the possible randomized exponents by computing d˜ri = d˜ + ri.N , for all i and
ri ∈ [0, 232 − 1]. Considering λ as being the bit length of the blinding factor r,
the λ most signiﬁcant bits of d + r.ϕ(N) are equivalent to the most signiﬁcant
bits of d˜ + r.N . Then, the adversary can compute all possible values for r and
by observing the recovered randomized exponent dr, he can deduce r. Finally,
he constructs the attack on exponentiation traces containing possibly known
blinding factors.
6 Countermeasures
The eﬃciency of single-execution attacks on exponentiations are related to the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of acquired traces. Theoretically, the Alg. 1 is SPA-
protected because it is regular and all manipulated data are randomized due to
algorithmic (exponent blinding) and arithmetic (leak resistant arithmetic) coun-
termeasures. If diﬀerent operands are read and written depending on the expo-
nent bits, in a practical implementation of the Montgomery ladder the memory
accesses cause addressing related leakages, as demonstrated through the unsu-
pervised attack.
Hardware countermeasures as the insertion of time disarrangement, dummy
cycles or frequency dividers reduce the SNR. Balancing the power consumption
is an alternative to avoid the leakage of information due conditional tests or
control decisions.
If the leakage is related to memory access, a possible solution is the ran-
domization of the RAM addresses during the exponentiation. By doing so, the
unsupervised attack was unable to entirely recover the randomized exponent.
By selecting the same points of interest P = {pj}, we applied the fuzzy k-means
clustering algorithm and recovered approximately 80% of the exponent using the
Bayesian classiﬁer technique.
7 Conclusions
This paper presented an unsupervised attack on randomized exponentiations.
The explored leakages are based on control executions and memory addressing.
We proposed to combine the cluster classiﬁcation for several points of interest
over each exponent bit interpretation in order to derive the randomized expo-
nent using a single EM trace. The results were presented through three diﬀerent
statistical techniques and speciﬁcally for the probability density function and
Bayesian Classiﬁer techniques, we showed the likelihood for the randomized ex-
ponent bits.
The presented unsupervised attack demonstrated the eﬃciency of cluster-
ing algorithms against single execution of exponentiations even in the presence
of algorithmic and arithmetic countermeasures. The obtained results show the
importance of employing hardware countermeasures in public-key architectures.
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